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Abstract 
The collapse of states is a phenomenon as old as the state itself. State collapse and failure 
in the modern context, however, have triggered the emergence of new trends in international 
politics such as militarized humanitarian intervention. While much literature has been generated 
about these topics, very little has examined the failure of the state from the perspective of power 
relationships between states. In this work, I use the concept of sovereign power outlined by 
Giorgio Agamben to study the application of power structures internationally in events of state 
failure and collapse through humanitarian intervention and statebuilding attempts. I argue that 
just as individuals can be made and unmade as citizens, so can states be made and unmade as 
sovereign by the international community. 
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Introduction 
 The failure of states is not a new phenomenon. Within the last twenty-five years there has 
been a drastic increase in the number of “failed and collapsed states,” with particularly explosive 
cases such as Somalia and Kosovo captivating the attention of International Relations (IR) 
scholars, philosophers, political scientists, and almost every branch of the social sciences. Much 
of the consideration given to these failed and collapsed states focuses on how and why these 
states fell, and in cases of intervention, how such a decision to intervene was justified. Very few 
scholars, however, have considered what the identification as failed or collapsed implies with 
regard to global power structures. 
 International intervention, likewise, is an area which does not get much attention from 
anthropologists. Much of the literature that refers to intervention or power relationships between 
intervening and intervened states simply identifies such occurrences as examples of neo-
colonialism or a form of post-colonial power exertion (Edkins 2005; Biswas & Nair 2010); 
however, such distinctions only tell us about the directionality of the mechanism, not about how 
it works. Relationships between modern states are not frequently considered by anthropologists, 
who are usually more concerned with ground-level experiences of power and violence than the 
larger scale; which, to be fair, is typically considered the realm of political scientists, 
sociologists, and international relations scholars. This thesis seeks to examine the dynamics of 
power and violence which exist between states through the lens of international intervention and 
state collapse, and compare them to the ways power and violence are experienced between states 
and citizens. 
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 Two problematic phrases will be present throughout this work: sovereignty and sovereign 
power. Both of these phrases can be quite obscure because their definitions are almost entirely 
dependent on the context of their usage. While I explore both of these terms and their usage in a 
later section, for now it will suffice to use the following definitions. Sovereignty, in this work, 
describes the legitimacy of the boundaries of a state, both territorial and political, and the ability 
of a state to exert authority within these boundaries. A completely sovereign state, for example, 
is able to enact laws and actions within its boundaries without interference from external political 
bodies.  
Sovereign power, following from the model devised by Agamben (2005), is used here as 
the power to decide upon how authority should be exerted and the ability to enforce the decision. 
A simple example of sovereign power is the ability of a judge to decide the guilt or innocence of 
a defendant in court: the judge may both determine guilt and send the defendant to jail, or they 
may declare the defendant innocent and allow them to walk free. The judge has sovereign power 
because he possesses both the choice and the ability to enforce his decision. Notably, sovereign 
power is not limited to the state or political bodies (Agamben 1998).  
I contend that just as states exert sovereign power within their own boundaries, there has 
been a recent rise in states and bodies of states using the same kinds of sovereign power outside 
of their domestic state boundaries, and that this application of power is dependent upon the 
ability of the international community to delegitimize the citizenship and sovereignty of other 
states. This relationship manifests itself in many different ways; no two cases should be expected 
to be identical. Here, the relationship between states will be analyzed through the crucible of 
state failure and collapse in two “failed” states, Somalia and Kosovar Yugoslavia, by asking 
fundamental questions regarding the ways by which sovereignty is both respected and rejected 
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by the international community as well as what it means for a state to fail and, in the larger 
context, what it means for a state to be a member of the modern world order. Finally, attempts by 
the international community to reconstruct “collapsed” states will also be briefly discussed, as 
will the implications for the ways which sovereign power is exerted. 
 
Defining Collapse 
 While much work has been done regarding the failure and collapse of states, particularly 
within the last twenty years, the ways in which these processes have been defined has varied 
greatly both over time and among disciplines. Anthropologists, archaeologists, historians, and 
other researchers of other disciplines have long studied the collapse and fall of ancient states 
such as the Roman Empire and Mesopotamia. In the early 20th century, authors such as Spengler 
and Toynbee adopted the organismic view of the state: that all states go through stages of birth, 
growth, and death (Yoffee 2005). Likewise, in her analysis of early kingdoms, Marcus puts forth 
the suggestion that early states “collapsed” quite frequently, yet this was only a part of a greater 
process of the waxing and waning of these kingdoms and empires (Marcus 1998). Yoffee (2005) 
argues that the collapse of states never involves the total collapse of all institutions within a 
society and defines collapse as when the center can no longer secure resources from the 
periphery. Yoffee also notes that collapse usually entails the failure of “centralized institutions 
that facilitate the distribution of resources and information” (2005:139). These are just a few 
notable approaches; there have been others drawing from neo-evolutional theory and from the 
perspective of environmental causes, but these have recently been criticized as failing to account 
for the agency of the inhabitants of the failed state (Middleton 2012).  
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 When discussing the collapse of the modern Westphalian nation-state, however, there are 
a few key differences between these societies and the archaic states traditionally studied by 
archaeologists and historians. Archaic states were usually formed in regions with a shared 
culture, such as in Uruk and Sumer (Yoffee 2005), whereas the modern nation-state frequently 
contains artificially constructed boundaries which do not always accurately reflect the diverse 
identities of the citizens therein. This is a side-effect of periods of large-scale incorporation and 
integration into empires and empire-like structures such as those formerly headed by Western 
colonizers, but it has a profound effect on the political climate of many modern states. 
Additionally, while the collapse and restructuring of states can be considered a key historic 
process for societies (Wright 2006), it is often one which takes a long time to complete; for 
reference, one can consider the Dark Ages (to use an archaic term) following the fall of the 
Roman Empire, where inhabitants of areas such as Saxon Britain did not organize into a larger 
polity for almost two hundred years. Finally, while a globalized world is not a recent affair, the 
post-WWII ideologies of human rights and of sovereignty-as-responsibility have led to greater 
international involvement in the historically secluded process of collapse, evident through 
international intervention in some “failing” and “collapsing” states (Pantea 2013).  
Archaeologists and historians are not the only researchers who have been considering the 
issues of the collapse and failure of states; many political scientists and international relations 
scholars have become more interested in this phenomenon in recent years. Rotberg (2003:3), in 
his analysis of state failure, imagines the state as a provider of “political goods,” defined as the 
claims of citizens upon states such as human security and basic civil and political rights. He also 
prescribes a hierarchy to these political goods, with the “human security” good at the top and 
more flexible goods, or those that are able to be privatized, at the bottom (2003:3). A few other 
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metrics for determining the weakness of the state are listed: targeting of citizens by state-
sponsored violence, growth of criminal networks, “flawed institutions” (power residing only in 
the executive branch), privatization of health and education systems, excessive economic 
disparity, decaying infrastructure, corruption, and the loss of legitimacy of the state (2003:6-9). 
 Rotberg’s model also contains four levels of state failure: strong, failing, failed, and 
collapsed. Strong states clearly control their territories and provide a suite of political goods to 
their citizens (Rotberg 2004:4). Failing, or weak, states are essentially strong but are 
experiencing momentary weakness from either economic or political conditions, such as 
harboring potential ethnic conflict or leadership by corrupt officials (2004:4-5). Failed states are 
“tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions,” and often may 
face resistance by one or more insurgencies (2004:4-5). Collapsed states are described, rather 
vividly, as somewhere “the forces of entropy have overwhelmed the radiance that hitherto 
provided some semblance of order and other vital political goods to the inhabitants (no longer 
the citizens) embraced by language, ethnic affinities, or borders” (2004:9-10).  
 Rotberg’s analysis differs from the model developed by the State Failure Task Force, 
which only designates states as either failed or non-failed for the sake of creating a more 
inclusive model (Howard 2010:10). This bifurcated model defines a state as failed if it 
experiences revolutionary war, ethnic war, an adverse or disruptive regime transition, or 
genocides/politicides within a given year (Howard 2010:10). Howard (2010:21) puts forward the 
statistically-based “Severity Stage” model which relies upon several variables, namely: dissident 
behavior, non-violent protest, economic decline, proximity to a state in crisis, the presence of 
corrupt state authority, weak institutional development, and the presence of an autocratic and/or 
partially democratic regime. There are also other models developed by non-academic entities, 
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such as the non-governmental organization (NGO) Fund for Peace, whose model relies on 
several variables such as the rise of factionalized elites, amount of external intervention, number 
of displaced peoples, economic decline, entropy of public services, and state legitimacy (FFP 
2014). 
 Thus, we can see why the previously suggested models of state failure are of limited use 
for this analysis: none of them properly capture the ability of the state to express its sovereignty. 
For example, Howard’s model tracks dissident behavior and instances of non-violent protest, but 
does not consider the state’s response to these events. Did the state respond with force? If so, to 
what degree? Could the state respond? The model developed by the State Failure Task Force 
provides us with information about the presence of conflict, but not about the nature of said 
conflict. These models generally ignore or only just consider the state’s ability to express its 
authority, particularly with regard to violence (in the general sense) committed against the 
citizenry (Rotberg 2003:42).   
While these indexes may tell us about the present condition of the state in question, they 
do not give us the necessary historical background to address the problems they identify. Put 
simply: these taxonomies do a wonderful job of identifying the state as broken, but what this 
level of brokenness entails is entirely determined by the individual or group who is performing 
the examination. As such, the demarcation of a state as “failing” or “collapsed” is entirely 
subject to the viewpoint of the researcher, who is normally writing from a Western perspective 
(Biswas and Nair 2010). The ability of these researchers to declare not only what is exceptional, 
but also what is “stable,” demonstrates a position of power over the states which they observe. 
Moreover, the dissimilarity of these models seems to make “collapse” an ambiguous taxonomic 
category at best. 
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 There have also been criticisms leveled at the concept of “state failure” as justification for 
the “sovereign intervention in the exceptional third world” (Biswas & Nair 2010:19-22). Biswas 
and Nair (2010:20) point to the US occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, two “failed states,” and 
the discourse regarding ungoverned spaces in Africa which they deem to have “echoes” of 
colonialism. Relatedly, Perera (2010) points out the failures of the “international community” in 
Sri Lanka; that due to the “strategic inconsequentiality” of Sri Lanka, violence there essentially 
“does not matter” (Biswas 2010:20). This formulation, however, touches on a greater working of 
sovereign power in the modern world order, but falls short of acknowledging that just as states 
create “bare life,” a person or population stripped of all rights and legal status, within their own 
borders, other nations and international bodies with the capacity (power, manifested in the 
decision) to act possess the powers to both declare the “state of exception” beyond their own 
borders and are party to the process of the creation of “bare life”, willing or not (Agamben 1998, 
2005). In the following sections I will elaborate on the ways that this phenomenon functions in 
the modern world order. 
 
Defining Sovereignty 
 Sovereignty, in recent times, has proven difficult to define. Krasner provides the most 
comprehensive definition by separating sovereignty into four categories:  
1) Domestic Sovereignty: the state’s ability to name the “state of exception,” or to exert 
control within its own borders 
 2) Interdependance Sovereignty: the ability of a state to control its borders 
 3) International Legal Sovereignty: recognition as a legitimate state by other states 
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 4) Westphalian Sovereignty: lack of authority over the state other than the domestic 
authority (Krasner 2001:7-12; Agamben 2005)  
As stated previously, these can be summarized as the ability of a state to exert authority within 
its territorial and political boundaries without interference from other political bodies (Krasner 
2001). This authority can take many forms, including both repressive actions such as Jim Crow 
laws or apartheid policies and actions by which the state provides for its citizens such as the 
institution of a welfare system. For my purposes, a somewhat abstract understanding of 
sovereignty will be used: for a state to be sovereign it does not matter what policies it pursues, 
only that it is able to pursue them effectively without fear of intervention. 
 So, then, how is the ability of the state to express its sovereignty assessed? First, a 
distinction must be made between failure and loss of authority. A state can be classified as 
failing (weak) yet still exert a great deal of control over its population; such is the case of 
authoritarian states (an indicator of failure by Rotberg) like the current North Korea. While 
authoritarian or repressive states might be using an excessive application of state power to mask 
weaknesses or insecurities, these states still normally exert their authority on their populations 
just as much as if these same states were providing political goods. The only difference, in this 
regard, between a “good” state and a repressive state is the way authority is wielded, but both 
types of state can be considered sovereign as long as the application of state authority is not 
challenged by another political body. 
On the other hand, once a state has collapsed it no longer possesses sovereignty because 
it no longer retains the capacity to ensure that policies or actions enacted by the state will not be 
subject to interference by external actors. An example of this loss of sovereignty is the Somalian 
state’s lack of ability to resist United Nations (UN) intervention in the early 1990’s; I am quite 
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sure that if the UN had attempted to send a peacekeeping force to Ferguson, Missouri, during the 
recent riots, the US would have resisted such an incursion. Such a loss of authority is not sudden, 
but rather the product of years of neglect and mistreatment of the state and its infrastructure 
(Rotberg 2004:15). Once a state’s sovereignty has faltered enough to be declared collapsed, there 
is usually a vacuum of power coupled with a near-complete decay of infrastructure; however, 
this vacuum of power also allows the international community to intervene without violating the 
sovereignty of the state in question (at least, in theory). 
It is worth noting that much of the current discussion of sovereignty actually takes the 
form of a discussion on sovereign power (see Hansen & Stepputat 2005) instead of the kinds of 
formal sovereignty listed above. The creation and exertion of sovereign power as a method of 
study has roots in Foucauldian thought and has been most recently been exemplified in the work 
of Giorgio Agamben. Agamben, drawing from the work of Carl Schmitt, suggests that the 
fundamental function of sovereign power is the creation of “sacred life” (his homo sacer) which 
may be “killed but not sacrificed” (1998:53). In other words, it is the declaration of who is 
considered a citizen with juridico-politcal status (bios), able to be included in the workings of the 
sovereign (in this case, the state) because they have been granted such status, and who is an 
outsider (zoe), who is only included in the domain of the sovereign by their exclusion. Excluded 
groups, which do not have claims to the rights of citizens, are what constitute “bare life” 
(Agamben 1998). 
 Agamben (2005) puts forth another argument, again drawing from Carl Schmitt, which is 
helpful when conceptualizing sovereign power: the state of exception. His argument is built upon 
the idea that within a legal framework there will be instances which fall under the norm, where a 
precedent has already been set, or the exception, where a decision must be made: it is in this 
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decision that the sovereign power lies (Agamben 2005:35). He argues that the state of exception, 
tied inexorably to the state of nature, was given physical form by the creation of the 
concentration camp, a place where all legal norms were suspended and the subjects were 
rendered as “bare life” by the sovereign decision of those administering the camp (Agamben 
2005:4). In the camp, law became inseparable from violence and those in it were declared 
exceptional, entirely vulnerable to the sovereign decision (Agamben 2005:39-40; Biswas & Nair 
2010). 
 This method of examining dynamic power relations as a property of social relations 
more broadly enables us to better examine the ways by which “bare life” is created by sovereign 
power, including groups which have not been traditionally defined as “sovereign” such as non-
governmental organizations (Hansen & Stepputat 2005:17). However, the analysis provided by 
many anthropologists and professionals from other disciplines has been focused around 
applications of sovereign power by both state actors and organizations such as humanitarian 
groups on populations such as minorities, migrants, and refugees (see Biswas & Nair 2010; 
Perera 2010; Nair 2010; Woodling 2010; Ong 2005; Chatterjee 2005; and Hepner & O’Kane 
2009). While there has been very careful consideration about the ability of sovereign power to be 
exerted on citizens and populations, there has been very little examination of the prospect that 
there are mechanisms of sovereign power that exist between states, not just within them. 
In the recent past, the world has seen the emergence of the “humanitarian war,” which 
both dehumanizes the enemy and serves to legitimize the conflict in question, and a general ethos 
of intervention (including all forms, such as economic sanctions and medical aid, not just 
military per se) by the First World (Biswas & Nair 2010). While the true purposes of these 
conflicts and interventions may or may not be humanitarian in nature, the display of sovereign 
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power they produce is the point of interest here. Under the Schmittian-Agambenian decisionist 
scheme, the ability of the First World to declare another region or, at times, an entire state as 
exceptional demonstrates an expression of sovereign power by the intervening body over the 
intervened (Agamben 2005). This can be most blatantly seen in situations of military 
intervention such as the UN intervention in Kosovo and the US invasions of Iraq, wherein the 
Westphalian sovereignty, as defined by Krasner (2001), of both states was negated by the 
application of foreign sovereign power. 
 
Sovereign Power, Sovereignty, Security, and Rights: 
 Historically, human rights and the international human rights culture have been seen as a 
challenge to the sovereignty of individual states (Clapham 2007:59-60). Many UN-defined 
human rights, however – those defined by International Bill of Rights – would be categorized by 
Rotberg (2003:3) as the political good of “human security,” his “most important good.” So, to 
Rotberg, these rights are necessary for the development of a “stable” state. Granted, this 
definition of stability is somewhat loaded, as it is experienced from the view of a first-world 
liberal democracy. Ergo, let us say that a state that provides rights to its citizens is doing so as an 
extension of sovereignty, just as much as if it were entirely restricting them. 
 This should not be a revolutionary statement, nor is it intended to be. The challenge to 
sovereignty comes from two fronts: the guaranteed rights of individuals in international law, a 
sphere which supersedes the domestic state, and the potential for intervention (military or 
otherwise) by another state or body of states (Clapham 2007:62-63). Thusly, the dangerous 
connection between state security and failure becomes clear. If a state retains the ability to 
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maintain its borders and express authority within them despite failing, the international 
community’s ability to respond to humanitarian disasters is limited as long as the sovereignty 
(specifically, the Westphalian sovereignty) of the offending state is paramount; notably, 
according to the UN Charter, it is (1945: Article II).1 However, if the state has already collapsed, 
there is no sovereign to respect and no state to offend, as argued by Ayoob (2001:82). 
 However, if Agamben’s model of the sovereign decision is taken into account, then the 
“respectable sovereign” described by Ayoob (2001:82) may not be as relevant as even the UN 
Charter might have us believe. As elaborated earlier, if the potentially intervening bodies (not 
limited to just states, but inter-state bodies such as the UN and NATO) are able to make a choice 
regarding intervention in another state, this decision is the manifestation of their sovereign 
power; meaning, quite frankly, that the very idea of a “sovereign” nation-state might be a flawed 
conception. The “sovereign” nation-state, introduced with the Treaty of Westphalia, is not a 
natural means of organizing of large groups of people, but rather a social construction which 
depends on the willing participation of its constituents to have any real authority. This means that 
in effect, the ability of a state to not be interfered with by external political bodies constitutes a 
“right” of the modern nation-state rather than a property, and rights may be violated.    
While the previous focus was on the interactions of states with each other, the 
implications for inhabitants of intervened states will now be discussed. If, regarding 
humanitarian crises such as mass starvation and poverty or even more extreme scenarios such as 
genocide, political persecution, or other violence-based human rights infringements, there is a 
decision regarding intervention then the potentially intervening body is also party to the creation 
                                                          
1
 While much has been written about the “paternalistic” nature of humanitarian aid and intervention, and the 
topic itself is paramount that we consider, it is not what is of issue here. 
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of the homo sacer by abandonment in these instances. By choosing who is and is not worth 
“including,” the intervening body must decide who must be relegated to the camp and who may 
be liberated (Agamben 1998). To continue the metaphor of the camp, as it is impossible to free 
all those interred to the camp due to lack of time and resources, a fundamental action of the 
intervening bodies is to decide upon who may be freed and who must remain as “bare life,” to 
face the reality of either incurring imperialist charges or being blasé to those facing the reality of 
the camp (Agamben 1998; Biswas & Nair 2010; Perera 2010).  
 It is apparent now that under Agamben/Schmitt’s model, the concept and implementation 
of universal human rights posits no inherent challenge to state sovereignty; this is merely a 
proximate cause of the contradictory power dynamics of sovereign power as it relates to human 
rights, the respective values of state membership in the modern world order, and the rights of 
individual citizens within said order. In simpler terms, the rights of individual citizens and the 
rights of individual states as members of the international community fundamentally differ and 
oppose each other. When these opposing forces meet, the ensuing decisions which must be made 
have produced the modern concepts of human rights and ways that they are implemented when 
the rights of individuals are prioritized over those of the state. The original examination must 
now be returned to: how do the concepts and enforcement of the universal human rights ethos 
present themselves in the event of state failure and collapse? More specifically, how do these 
state-state, state-suprastate, and internal state relations of sovereign power manifest during times 
of political turmoil and state failure? 
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Somalia: State Collapse and Intervention 
 Of all the states that collapsed in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, Somalia is the only one 
that remains without a central government. It should be noted that the collapse of Somalia, as 
emphasized by both Rotberg (2003) and Mohamoud (2006), was not the result of a single event 
but rather the culmination of decades of mismanagement with regard to economic policies, 
infrastructure, administration, use of state-sponsored violence, and various other causes; 
essentially fulfilling all four aforementioned models of failure to the letter (Howard 2010). 
However, as Rotberg (2003:11) asks, the demarcation of a state as ‘failed’ is not a sentence; 
therefore, he asks, why did the Somalian state collapse, considering the significant ethnic unity 
of the Somali people?  
Mohamoud (2006:135-136) attributes this collapse primarily to the power vacuum left by 
the sudden departure of Siad Barre followed by the “Post State Civil War” in which the United 
Somali Congress (USC), the Somali National Alliance (SNA), and the Somali National 
Movement (SNM) all sought to fill the void left by Barre. As a result of this conflict, as well as 
the preceding one against Siad Barre himself, it was estimated that between 165,000 and 300,000 
people were displaced within in the Bari, Nugaal, and Mudug regions combined (Kapteijns 
2013:179). Between November 1991 and February 1992 fighting in Mogadishu had claimed 
14,000 lives and approximately 27,000 people had been wounded; Kapteijns (2013:179) notes 
hauntingly that “the concept of civilian noncombatant had been completely abandoned by all 
sides” (original emphasis). It was these factors, compiled with the essentially non-existent 
Somalian infrastructure, which lead the authors of all models to describe Somalia as a collapsed 
state (Rotberg 2003; Howard 2010; FFP 2014).  
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 This gives us the background for the UNITAF intervention by the UN in December of 
1992. However, in a very critical analysis of the UN response to Somalia, Mohamed Sahnoun 
notes that there were moments of intervention possible for the UN prior to the collapse of the 
state in 1991 and that “if the international community had intervened earlier… much of the 
catastrophe that has occurred would have been avoided” (appears in Mohamoud 2006). These 
earlier points included the beginning of the clan-based uprising in 1988 (see Kapteijns 2013), the 
signing of a manifesto for reconciliation in 1990, and immediately after the overthrow of Siad 
Barre in 1991 (Mohamoud 2006:138-139). Assuming that the UN and its members were very 
much aware of the conflict in Somalia, their decision to remain inactive from 1988 to 1992 
contributed to the creation of “bare life” by the conflict by consciously making the decision that 
the right of the Somalian state not to be intervened superseded the rights of Somalian citizens to 
live in safety. This is not meant to level charges of omissionary sins from the position of 
hindsight; however, that there was a choice, under the Schmittian-Agambenian construction, 
shows that the international community here exerted a level of sovereign power over the Somali 
people by the decision of both when and how to intervene (Biswas & Nair 2010).  
 The military intervention by the UN and the US also led to another paradigm shift in 
global politics: the advent of “armed peacekeeping” and a militarized “humanitarian 
intervention” (Mohamoud 2006:140). While the proclaimed goal of these operations was to 
“enable the starving to be fed” (TIME Magazine, December 14, 1992:25), the post-Cold War 
advent of military intervention into another state provides us with one of the first examples of a 
“higher” state (or, in this instance, a conglomerate of states) declaring a state of exception 
outside of its own borders. It is worth noting that, in Ayoob’s (2001) terms, there is no 
respectable state authority here to offend and that the goals (at least, the proclaimed goals) of the 
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initial intervention were to provide the basic human needs for the Somali population, including 
them in the citizenship, now made global, and preventing them from becoming “bare life” by the 
application of sovereign power internationally.  
 Two forms of intervention from state and supra-state based actors were present in 1992-
1993 Somalia. On the one hand, there was the traditional “humanitarian” relief in the form of 
food, medical supplies, and other items designed to help during a crisis. That the international 
community decided to send this aid also implies a decision regarding the status of the Somali 
people: their rights to life-sustaining processes would for the moment be given higher priority 
than the right of the Somalian state to political self-determination, regardless of the motivations 
of sending states. To reiterate, this was enabled by the seeming absence of a “sovereign” 
Somalian state.  
This initial intervention was followed by a military response designed not in the 
traditional interests of territorial or economic gain but in the interests of “peacekeeping”: 
notably, the same oft-cited reason for the implementation of “states of emergency” (Agamben 
2005). The difference here is that the state of emergency was declared not by the Somalian state, 
but by an entity (nearly) entirely separate from the state: the UN, US, and the international aid 
apparatus. This would be the final nail in the coffin for Somalian sovereignty: the ability of the 
Somalian state, or the remnants of it, to exert authority within domestic borders had been 
eradicated. This is not to say that there were not groups within Somalia able to resist this new 
international application of sovereign power; these groups certainly existed, but they could not 
exert power to the same degree as the intervening forces. 
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 However, the decisionist model, where sovereign power lies in the ability to decide how 
authority can be expressed, may be taken even further. In the attempts at rebuilding the state 
performed by UNOSOM and UNOSOM II, the two UN taskforces designated with the task of 
reestablishing the state in Somalia, these groups were able to exert significant power on the 
Somali people by deciding who would be negotiated with and established as the leaders of the 
new state (Mohamoud 2006). UNISOM emphasized a traditional “top-down” approach to 
restoring order in Somalia, choosing to negotiate with the various warlords who had taken power 
in the vacuum left by Siad Barre who had only the “power of the gun” and the “threat of 
violence… to keep the population hostage” with no legitimacy in the eyes of the people 
(Mohamoud 2006:158).  
These attempts to legitimize Somalian warlords as leaders ultimately failed due to both 
the economic disparity and the escalated tensions between the various clans in Somalia following 
the civil war after Siad Barre’s departure (Mohamoud 2006:158-159). This shows that while the 
international community does have the ability to exert sovereign power on failed states, this 
power is not absolute and may still be resisted and contested by the population it affects. Hence, 
the effect of the application of sovereign power depends greatly on the socio-political climate in 
which it occurs (Biswas & Nair 2010; Connolly 2004). 
To summarize, the intervention of Somalia constituted an externally declared “states of 
exception.” Whereas the failure and ultimate collapse of the Somali state was caused by a myriad 
of both internal and external forces, the collapse itself opened the door for an emergent type of 
intervention: one where forces external to the state can openly (Cold War politics aside) govern 
and elect who would rule in the absence of a sovereign, as the UN did by attempting to install 
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Somali warlords as leaders of the state. It would not be long, however, before this system would 
be applied to states that had not yet collapsed.  
 
Kosovo: NATO Creates a New Paradigm 
 The NATO intervention of Kosovo happened under similar pretense as that of Somalia; 
however, somewhat ironically, the failure of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia goes entirely 
unmentioned by Rotberg, Howard, the SFTP, and the FFP. However, by applying Rotberg’s and 
the SFTP’s models, we can see that the region controlled by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) were either failed or failing quite dangerously.2 The violence associated with the Balkans 
during the 1990’s has been largely attributed to “ancient ethnic hatreds” between Serbs, 
Albanians, and Croatians; in the context of Kosovo, the primary conflict was between Albanian 
and Serbian groups (Hehir 2010). This ethnic violence eventually escalated to the scale that in 
1998, the World Refugee Survey Kosovo reported a total of 300,000 displaced peoples (Hehir 
2010:7) and the ethnic conflict was considered to be so endemic that it threatened the stability of 
the region. Hehir (2010) also attributes the omission of Kosovo, largely supported by the 
Kosovar Albanians, from the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords which ended the Bosnian War and the 
inclusion and recognition of the FRY as fuel for the conflict, leading to an open confrontation 
between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the FRY.                                                                                                                             
The 1999 decision for NATO to intervene was not reached lightly, however. Lyon and 
Malone (2010) note that the decision to intervene was controversial in many Western countries, 
                                                          
2
 The models proposed by Howard and FFP were not applied here as they are both statistical models and require a 
truly massive amount of data to obtain a usable result. While I have full confidence that these models would 
support the results from Rotberg’s model as well as the SFTF’s, the necessary data was unable to be obtained. 
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with most people only supporting an intervention which minimized risk to Western troops, and 
that the choice of intervention was an intersection of morality, national interest, and the influence 
of elite dialogue as factors in the decision. In March of 1999, NATO began air raids on FRY 
forces. After NATO intervention the FRY were only able to last a few months, withdrawing and 
surrendering on June 10, 1999 (Hehir 2010). After the retreat of the FRY, the UN instated the 
UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), tasked with statebuilding in the now 
failed Kosovo (Hehir 2010). UNMIK would assume responsibility of rebuilding the now-defunct 
judicial system, amongst other things, by training new police (CIVPOL and, later, the KPS) and 
attempting to enforce a legal system so as to impose some semblance of order (Ryan 2010); in 
other words, much like in Somalia, the UN was the new sovereign. However, rather than 
attempting to instate and “fix” the local government, UNMIK chose to administer Kosovo for 
years after the surrender of the FRY. The UN presence in Kosovo has persisted into recent times; 
however, Kosovo officially declared independence in 2008 (Hehir 2010). 
 In his analysis of the foreign-imposed state of exception in Kosovo, Ryan (2010:120) 
proposes the idea of terra sacer to accompany Agamben’s homo sacer. While he does not define 
the term, it can be surmised as the “bare land” created by the exclusion of a political body from a 
larger network of similar bodies; in this case, a state from a community of states. This political 
body, and the territory they control, no longer possess the right to self-determination. In the 
Westphalian nation-state, losing the right to political self-determination can be directly equated 
to the loss of sovereignty. He writes that the FRY in the above circumstances represent this terra 
sacer in the modern times, stating that the: 
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“violence (bombing) over the FRY was an extra-juridical act perpetrated by a community 
upon an outsider that enabled the international community to wrest from the FRY its 
capacity to decide the state of exception” (Ryan 2010:120) 
By means of humanitarian intervention, the crown of sovereignty had been transferred to the 
UNMIK, who much like UNISOM were in the position to decide upon what institutions would 
be promoted and what laws and ideals would be enforced. Here, the idea of “statebuilding” as an 
extension of sovereign power in intervened states is visible once again. The Yugoslav state was 
no more, leaving the UN to administer Kosovo with full impunity. 
 
States as Citizens and International Power Relations 
 Thus far, I have discussed two events of military intervention under the guise of 
humanitarian aid to show the events leading to the declaration of foreign states of exception. But 
what of those states where there is no intervention, military or otherwise? Why, for example, has 
there been no intervention in Sri Lanka or in Colombia (neither of which is, or has been, denoted 
as failing although they both fall, or have come very close to falling, under many of the 
categories for failure present in all four of the previous models listed (Howard 2012))? Ayoob 
(2002:85) argues that this phenomenon is largely because decisions of intervention are made at 
the national level, with national interests in mind, rather than as international decisions. This 
insight, however, fails to recognize the significance of who is making the decisions. 
 To begin, humanitarian intervention should be viewed in terms of power. The intervening 
states/state groups (namely, the US, UN, and NATO) are, as previously articulated, exerting 
sovereign power over the intervened state. Likewise, as the intervened state and their population 
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still possess an ability to resist the exertion of power over them to some degree, such an 
application of sovereign power should not be viewed as absolute but rather as part of a 
relationship between a source of authority and social powers which might resist them (Connolly 
2004:30; Dillon 2004:42). In the cases of Somalia and Kosovo, the intervening states and groups 
of states were largely the same set of actors. This can also be said for nearly every 
“humanitarian” intervention since the end of the Cold War: if one looks closely, they can begin 
to see the hubs of sovereign power at play. Hardt and Negri touch upon this power relationship in 
their Empire, where there is a “network of powers and counterpowers structured in a boundless 
and inclusive architecture” and “power has no actual and localizable terrain or structure... [but] is 
distributed… through mobile and articulated mechanisms of control” (2000, appears in Connolly 
2004).  
 This conception, however, is not entirely correct. Many criticisms of Empire have 
centered on the resemblance between this “new world order” and the previous colonial world 
domination by European agents, terming it as a “liberal world order” (Hindness 2005:242). 
However, both models rely on the same ideologies of territoriality and citizenship, only with 
different emphasis. The concept of citizenship is what is of interest here. Citizenship is typically 
defined as “a matter of relations between individuals and the state to which they belong” as well 
as “one of the markers used by states in their attempts to regulate the movement of people across 
borders” (Hindness 2005:243). From this, it would seem that citizenship is phrased in terms of 
the state.  
 Agamben (1998) likewise considers the making and unmaking of citizens, his bios and 
zoe, the fundamental function of sovereign power. In other words, sovereign power is the ability 
to decide who has rights and who does not (Agamben 1998). However, the previous argument 
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put forward by Ryan (2010) of terra sacer seems to presume that states and territories experience 
sovereign power in a similar fashion to individuals. If we accept that territories themselves may 
be made exceptional and reduced to “bare land” by a sovereign power, and that these territories 
can include entire states, then an exceptional state as terra sacer is directly analogous to the 
homo sacer. From this, I put forth the suggestion similar to that of Kustermans (2010) that just as 
individuals are made and unmade as citizens, that the ability of entire states to be declared 
exceptional implies that the same citizen-making powers being applied to individuals are also 
applied to states, making them de facto citizens in the modern world order.3 
 Using this paradigm, if we consider that the same centers of sovereign power are exerting 
their authority beyond their own national boundaries, then the unlocatable structure of power 
discussed by Hardt and Negri becomes more apparent. However, just as with individuals, the 
sovereign power to declare the terra sacer is not absolute; the decision is reliant on the social, 
cultural, and political climate in which it emerges (Connolly 2004). The ways by which the 
decision to create terra sacer is legitimized and given power must therefore be analyzed. 
 Ayoob (2002:87) touches on this idea, speaking to the “double standard” in 
interventionist policies between countries with greater and lesser influence globally. This trend 
can be seen visibly in which states have been declared as “failed” and which states have simply 
fallen into a status of “weakness”: the former is largely constructed of polities that are from, in 
economic terms, the periphery (FFP 2014). If we compare these models of state failure with 
instances of intervention by external forces, we see a striking corollary: while not all failed states 
                                                          
3
 I should be clear that I am not choosing a side here in the state-as-citizen debate. I am merely stating that in this 
instance it can be useful to think of the state as such; moreover, the dichotometric designation of states as citizens 
or not-citizens is artificial and ignores the complexity of the ways the state interacts with social, economic, and 
political realms as an entity. 
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have been intervened, intervention has only occurred in failed states (Rotberg 2002). The 
perceived failure of another state provides justification for intervention without becoming 
bogged down in a debate about the legitimacy of such distinctions or their usage (Biswas and 
Nair 2010). Likewise, it can be seen that interventional politics are much less prevalent in states 
which have not collapsed or failed, such as Colombia or Sri Lanka (Rotberg 2004;Ayoob 
2002;Perera 2010). The demarcation of a state as failed, however, serves to do more than justify 
intervention.  
This legitimization of intervention by the sovereign centers also requires the 
delegitimization of the sovereignty of the now-intervened body, as it is now a state of exception, 
making it a de facto sovereign-less state (Agamben 2005). However, if we do away with the 
previous abstraction, this system has the very real implication that the sovereignty of the 
periphery is entirely subject to the sovereign will of the West (Biswas & Nair 2010). From this, it 
is apparent that modern interventionist policies are not part of a violent relation vis a vis colonial 
interactions, but rather part of a relationship of power between the sovereign centers and the 
periphery (borrowing the phrase from world systems theory), wherein the loss of stability or 
failure of a state to provide the proper securities to citizens may warrant the same wresting of 
sovereignty that Ryan (2010:120) describes in his interpretation of the NATO management of 
Kosovo. This elucidates the system which demands both legitimization and delegitimization for 
such actions to occur (Ryan 2010:120); as such, the relationship between the centers of sovereign 
power and states whom would be intervened is not one of Foucauldian violence until such a state 
has failed or been weakened to the point where it can no longer retain sovereignty at the hands of 
an intervening factor. The reason that this relationship appears as one of violence rather than one 
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of power is because it is most visible after the transition to violence, where phenomenon such as 
militarized humanitarian intervention begin to occur. 
While the decision, and thusly the sovereign choice, toward intervention rests in the 
hands of a few central polities, the ability to express this decision can be expressed in terms of 
power relations between sovereign powers, which are exerting a force or power internationally, 
and sovereignties, nation-states with “citizenship” in the international community (Agamben 
2005;Connolly 2004). As, in Agamben’s (1998) terms, the work of humanitarian groups is 
inexorably linked to the sovereign, this paradigm has serious implications for any ideas or 
enforcement of universal human rights: in many cases, humanitarian groups will depend upon 
the exertion of sovereign power to some extent in order to operate. The dilemma presented 
earlier still remains: the choice presented to these sovereign hubs of power is either to intervene 
on behalf of human rights (if we assume that true humanitarian intervention is possible) or to 
abandon those rendered bare life to the camp.  
It should be noted that this conversation also entails some discussion of the rules that 
accompany order. Some authors, particularly those in IR or International Law, have discussed 
the concept of rules being the normative concepts which govern international relations (Lang 
2010:66-67). These authors do not consider that a discussion of rules also entails a discussion of 
power, and to paraphrase Agamben (2005): if those who make the rules break the rules, then who 
is to stop them? The sovereign entity, by definition, is both included and excluded from the 
normal system of laws and rules which it adjudicates (Agamben 2005). In the international sense, 
while these intervening actors must abide by the “rules” of international involvement to some 
extent, the breaking of said rules has often gone unpunished. While NATO, for example, was 
admonished by Russia over their intervention in Kosovo, the only form of authority Russia was 
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able to enact was in the form of a resolution to the UN Security Council which was firmly 
rejected (Bellamy 2010:48). 
 
Conclusion 
 At the international level, it can be observed that sovereign power between states operates 
much as it does within a state. Just as individuals are rendered as citizen or homo sacer within 
the state, states themselves are made and unmade as terra sacer (or, more accurately, civitas 
sacer) by the global relations of sovereign power mentioned above (Ryan 2010; Agamben 1998). 
The failure or collapse of the state is but one mechanism by which global sovereign centers both 
legitimize their own authority and delegitimize the targets of intervention; one which is 
inseparably joined to ideas about the responsibility of sovereignty and the humanitarian nature of 
international law (Bellamy 2010). It is for this reason that we must reject thinking about 
international intervention in terms of justification and instead consider it in terms of the dynamic 
power/violence relations at play. Therefore, I must disagree with Biswas and Nair (2010) in their 
contention that any attempt to impose a “world order” would hinge upon the declaration of an 
“exceptional Third World,” but rather argue that many of the sovereign centers have already 
made clear their ability to decide upon the exceptionality, and thus the citizenship, of any state 
without the adequate stability and ability to contest or resist their exceptionality, and have done 
so for many years. That states, or groups of states, can decide upon the legitimacy of the 
sovereignty of other polities is a phenomenon that should not be ignored.   
 Thusly, we once again return to universal human rights. As we have seen, the sovereign 
decision for intervention rests in the global centers of sovereign power. While many authors 
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write about humanitarian intervention in a negative light, without the capacity for such 
intervention the very idea of universal human rights is powerless; ergo, many of the current 
mechanisms of the enforcement of human rights internationally rely on these “imperial” 
mechanisms of power. This is not to discount the social power of motivated groups or cultural 
norms, but rather to expose the means by which human rights are given political power. Without 
any means to declare the exceptionality discussed above, intervening bodies may only look 
inside the camp from the outside and lament its tragedies. However, should intervention on 
humanitarian behalf be allowed, there is no guarantee that another camp is not simply being 
constructed on the new terra sacer. 
We cannot escape the fact that our current systems of the enforcement of human rights 
are built upon these systems of sovereign power (Agamben 1998); in fact, starting with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, these concepts of universal human rights and the need 
to enforce them may have helped construct these power relations. If we reflect back to the ways 
that “stable” states are defined, many of the defining political goods fall under the purview of 
human rights.4 Ergo, while many authors are critical of the current mechanisms of sovereign 
power, those who seek something beyond the existing system of power must also consider the 
systems conjoined to it. Furthermore, the ability of the international community to delegitimize 
the sovereignty of another state under the correct conditions represents a fundamental function 
of this “new world order” based upon humanitarian intervention (Edkins 2005).  
Finally, the oft-overlooked capacity of international bodies such as the UN to participate 
in and dictate statebuilding activities is another massive extension of sovereign power; that we 
                                                          
4
 While the models of state failure present were actually created in the early 21
st
 century (10 years after the 
collapse of Somalia, 4 after the intervention into Yugoslavia) I feel that these concepts can be considered roughly 
contemporary. 
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even have a literature on how to mold a state in its infantile stages tells a great deal about the 
ability of certain sovereign centers and groups to express their authority. This exertion of 
sovereignty comes at a price, however; if, following from the ethnographic and archaeological 
models, the collapse of states is part of a natural cycle of wax and wane then the forced, rather 
than facilitated, rebuilding of collapsed states is likely to fail because it either makes the 
fundamental assumption that the new state will be identical to the original (failed) one or will see 
the state recreated in such as way as to stabilize or benefit existing power structures (Ayoob 
2002). 
 This authority, as noted above, is not final. It exists only as part of a relationship of 
power, one which requires the failure of the state in question or an equivalent form of 
delegitimizing force to become a relationship of violence. Perhaps sovereignty in the 
Westphalian nation-state is not, and has never been, a contractual obligation to observe and 
respect the boundaries of another state but rather a tenuous agreement between multiple factions 
seeking the upper hand against their adversaries and allies; one which dissolves upon the 
transition from power to violence. 
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